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Abstract 
The aim of this comparative study between the French and American markets, characterized by a different ownership structure 
is to examine the relationship between managerial ownership, the board of directors, the equity-based compensation and 
corporate performance. Regardless of the selected sample, we found on the one hand, a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance and on the other hand, in the case of managerial entrenchment board of directors 
is a substitute for managerial ownership to solve the agency problem. In addition, stock-based compensation is non-linear 
function with managerial ownership, contrary to previous studies that assume a monotonous or non-significant relationship. The 
hypothesis of endogeneity is valid only in the American case. This result leads us to believe that the U.S. CEO has a 
preference to hold a large percentage of shares of firms that generate a good performance to neutralize capital market 
monitoring. Our study is exclusive in terms of the effect of managerial ownership on corporate performance in terms of 
comparison between two markets, characterized by a difference in ownership structure. We determine the impact of equity 
compensation on the one hand, the managerial ownership where all the studies assume either a monotone or neutral 
relationship between these two variables and on the other hand, the effect of board in the alignment or managerial 
entrenchment cases. 
Keywords: Agency Theory, Managerial Entrenchment, Managerial ownership, Firm Performance, Board, Equity Compensation.  
Introduction1.
Discussion of previous research on the impact of managerial ownership, as an incentive mechanism and its effects on the 
performance of the company, primarily focuses on agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control (Berles and Means, 1932) which is due to the divergence of interests between managers and shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to Drakos and Bekiris (2010), agency problems have a negative impact on the value of the company 
while managerial ownership is a potential solution to this conflict of interests. However, according to Morck et al. (1988) 
and Denis et al. (1997) a high percentage of shares held by the manager, results in a reduction in the effectiveness of 
external governance mechanisms (capital market monitoring). A large number of previous studies shows that there is a 
non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance (Morck et al. (1988), Davies et al. (2005), Ng 
(2005), Cheng et al. (2012) Florackis et al. (2009) and Ruan et al. (2011)). 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), Yermack (1996) and Cheng et al. (2012), the board is considered a source 
mechanism for reducing agency conflicts between the CEO and shareholders. Therefore, referring to the substitution 
hypothesis of governance mechanisms, we expect that the board of directors’ effectiveness can affect the relationship 
between managerial ownership (alignment or entrenchment) and firm performance. 
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A comparative study between the American and French markets is interesting since, the latter is characterized by a 
concentrated ownership structure whereas in the US case the firm’s ownership structure is much dispersed.  
First, we perform an analysis on the relationship between performance and managerial ownership to determine the 
inflection points that correspond to the convergence or divergence of interests for both markets.  
Then, referring to the turning points, we perform a piecewise regression to determine if the board is a substitute for 
managerial ownership in the case of managerial entrenchment. 
Next, on the one hand, given the importance of pay equity as a component alignment of interests between the 
agent and the principal and on the other hand, referring to the study of Cheng et al. (2012) who try to explain the 
relationship between the total compensation received by the manager, the managerial ownership and board at once. We 
attempt to determine the relationship that may exist between this component of compensation and effectiveness of the 
board in the case of convergence or divergence of interests.  
Finally, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that managerial ownership is determined endogenously as a 
simultaneous equation where analysis is carried to determine the direction of causality between the managerial property 
and firm performance for both cases. 
Our study provides a contribution to the literature on several aspects.  
First, on the level of the sample, we try to compare the two markets, which are characterized by differences in 
ownership structure. Indeed, most studies focus on the U.S. and UK cases where firm’s ownership structure for these two 
cases is much dispersed and they ignore the other markets, which are characterized by a more concentrated ownership 
structure and a strong presence of institutional investors such as the French case.  
Our study is exclusive in terms of the effect of managerial ownership on corporate performance in terms of 
comparison between two markets, characterized by a difference in ownership structure. 
Second, there is an increasing number of studies on the impact of the board on firm performance as Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998), Jackling and Johl (2009) and Pathan and Faff (2013), but they have not held for the presence of 
alignment or entrenchment effect, except the investigation of Ng (2005) and Cheng et al. (2012). They tested the 
combined effect of the board and managerial ownership in the Chinese context that is characterized by a high 
concentration and a strong presence of the state as opposed to French and American cases where the state is not a 
potential shareholder. 
In addition, the study by Cheng et al. (2012) includes a score board to measure its effectiveness, it includes only 
the size of the board, the presence of independent directors and CEO duality. We will integrate in the board score other 
variables that are important for the proper functioning of this mechanism such as the presence of women on the board, 
the percentage of shares held by directors, the presence of the remuneration committee... 
Third, referring to the work of Cheng et al. (2012) where they have linked the importance of compensation received 
by the manager and the combined effect of the board and managerial ownership. Our study attempts to determine the 
impact of equity compensation on the one hand, the managerial ownership where all the studies assume either a 
monotone or neutral relationship between these two variables and on the other hand, the effect of board in the alignment 
or managerial entrenchment cases. 
Fourth, from the analysis of the simultaneous equations, we try to determine the direction of causality between 
managerial ownership and firm performance for both contexts and try to explain the difference, if there is any, in the 
results. 
The Following study is organized as follows, first, we present a literature review and research hypotheses (section 
2), then we present the sample and data sources (section 3) after that, we expose the model used (Section 4), then, we 
interpret the results (section 5), and determine the direction of causality between managerial ownership and firm 
performance (Section 6) and finally, we conclude this study (section 7). 
 
 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 2.
 
2.1 Managerial ownership / Performance 
 
Theoretically, two contradictory hypothesis explain the duality firm performance / managerial ownership.  
The hypothesis of convergence of interest where DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) suggest that the high managerial 
shareholding can solve the problem of asymmetric information related to investments. Therefore, based on this 
assumption, there is a positive relationship between the proportion of shares held by the manager and firm performance. 
Instead, according to the theory of entrenchment, we expect a negative relationship between these two variables. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that a large managerial shareholding can generate additional costs indeed, in this 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
         Mediterranean Journal of  
        Social Sciences     
Vol 8 No 1 
January 2017 
          
 80 
situation the manager has a significant voting power that isolates the shareholders of exercising effective control over the 
management of the CEO (Chen et al. 2012).  
In conclusion, the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance is a double-edged sword (Alignment of 
interests vs. Managerial entrenchment) (Hu and Izumida (2008)).  
At the empirical study, the results are mitigated, but they converge on the finding of a non-linear relationship 
between two variables such as inverted U-shaped as the work of (McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hu and Zhou (2008) 
and Chen et al. (2012)) or cubic type (N Form) such as studies by (Short and Keasey (1999), Ruan et al. (2011) and 
Cheng et al. (2012)) or quadratic relation as the study of (Cui and Mak (2002) and McConnell and Servaes (1990)) or 
quantum relation such as the study of (Davies et al.(2005), Florackis et al. (2009)). 
From the previous, we try to test the following hypothesis: 
H1: There exists a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
 
2.2 Managerial ownership / Performance / Board of directors 
 
According to Lasfer (2006), entrenchment hypothesis predicts that the manager who holds a high percentage of 
managerial ownership can dominate the board of directors and will therefore tend to reduce his role of monitoring for 
example by reducing the proportion of independent directors or combining functions of the CEO and board chairperson.  
As we have previously developed, we expect a negative relationship between managerial ownership and corporate 
performance in the case of managerial entrenchment. 
From the above and with reference to the study of Ng (2005), Lasfer (2006) and Cheng et al. (2012) we relate the 
performance of the company both, with the managerial ownership and the board characteristics. 
Thus, we verify the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firm performance is affected by the combined impact of managerial ownership and effectiveness of the board. 
 
2.3 Managerial ownership / Board of directors / Managerial compensation 
 
According to Ozdemir and Upneja (2012), the board of directors is a supervisory mechanism that monitors decisions by 
the manager and protects the rights of shareholders. In addition, to its impact on the performance of companies, it is 
responsible for monitoring the excessive compensation received by the manager. 
Core et al. (1999) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) suggest that managerial entrenchment makes it more difficult for 
shareholders to replace the manager and more, it facilitates the opportunistic behavior of the latter, especially at the level 
of compensation. 
Holderness and Sheehan (1991) and Ozkan (2007) suggest that the remuneration of the manager in the form of 
stock options and restricted stock is higher in the case of weak governance firms.  
In addition, Weir et al. (2001) suggest that equity-based compensation is positively associated with the managerial 
entrenchment. 
Several studies, such as Lewellen et al. (1997), Matsunaga (1995) and Mehran (1995) examine the relationship 
between the award equity-based compensation and managerial ownership.  
According to Mehran (1995), there exists an inverse relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs, 
while the granting of stock options or restricted stock may be a potential solution to align the interests of manager with 
those of shareholders.  
Based on the work of Cheng et al. (2012), who try to determine if the board is a substitute for managerial 
ownership in the case of managerial entrenchment to limit excessive managerial compensation.  
In addition, given the relationship between on the one hand, the equity-based compensation and board and, on the 
other hand, between the stock-based compensation and managerial ownership. 
We test the following hypothesis: 
H3: The equity-based compensation is influenced by a combined effect of managerial ownership and effectiveness 
of the board. 
 
 Selected Sample and Data Sources 3.
 
In terms of the American case, the initial sample is composed of the 300 largest companies, selected according to the 
criteria of market capitalization in the S&P500 index. 
For French firms, the initial sample consists of all companies belonging to the CAC All Tradable Index.  
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On the one hand, we have eliminated financial firms because they represent a different financial structure 
compared to other types of firms, thus 48 firms for the American case and 36 companies in the French case. On the other 
hand, we eliminated the companies where the data are not available, respectively 49 and 55 U.S. and French firms. The 
final sample represents 203 U.S. companies and 159 French companies, including a 9 years period from 2002 to 2010. 
We did use two main data sources, Compustat North America and Compustat Global database for financial 
variables, and annual reports for data related to governance and ownership structure of companies that we have 
collected manually. In addition, we used in the U.S case Thomson Reuters Institutional Ownership and Compustat 
ExecuComp databases to collect respectively data involving to the CEO compensation and the percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors. 
 
 Presentation of the Selected Models 4.
 
4.1 Managerial ownership / Performance 
 
As we reported above, we provide a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance, 
but the problem is to identify which type relationship is applicable for U.S. and French markets (square, cubic, quadratic 
or quantum). In addition, the two cases are characterized by a different ownership structure, including the managerial 
ownership. Therefore, we will determine for each of the two cases the nature of the relationship which best explains these 
two variables. 
The model to be tested is as follows, based on the study of Davies et al. (2005), Florackis et al. (2009) and Chen et 
al. (2012). 
Tobin’s Q =  + Cont.Var +  ; k = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}         (1) 
With: 
- Tobin's Q: A proxy for measuring firm’s performance where it has been used in several previous studies such as 
(Cui and Mak (2002), Davies et al (2005) and Hu and Izumida (2008). It is measured as follows: 
Tobin’s Q =         (2) 
Where: 
- MEV: Market equity value; 
- BVE: Book value of equity; 
- BVTA: Book value of total assets; 
- Manag.Owner: Managerial ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by the manager; 
- Cont. Var. The control variables that could affect the firm’s performance and they are derived from previous 
work. We were referring to studies Morck el al. (1988) and Maury (2006) we use the following variables: 
- Size: The size of the firm is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
- Lev: The debt of the firm is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
- Volat: Equity volatility is measured by the standard deviation of stock returns. 
 
4.2 Managerial ownership / Performance / Board of directors 
 
To examine the relationship between the effectiveness of the board and the performance of the company considering the 
effect of managerial ownership (interest alignment or entrenchment). We determine the extremum point (maximum or 
minimum) that correspond to the convergence of interest or managerial entrenchment.  
Concerning the American (French) case, the critical points are of 11.0895% 48.3692% and 61.5412% (57,538%), 
representing the percentage of shares held by the manager1. 
We adapt a model of piecewise linear regression to highlight the effect of non-linearity of the managerial 
ownership, in accordance with the same approach in the studies of Morck et al. (1988), Hess et al. (2010), Ruan et al. 
(2011) and Cheng et al. (2012). More precisely, the managerial ownership variable (.manag prop) is divided as follows:  
For the French case:  
 
                                                                            
1 The choice of the nature of the model and results are discussed in section interpretation of results 
ik
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For the American case: 
    
 
 
 
Therefore, the piecewise regression model is estimated for the following two cases: 
France: 
  
United States: 
  
Where: 
- The Tobin's Q, Manag.OwnerA, Manag.OwnerB, Manag.OwnerC, Manag.OwnerD, Size, Lev and Volat are 
previously defined. 
For variable (Bd.Index), it is the score board where some authors such as (Klapper and Love (2004) and Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008)) use this measure as a proxy for the effectiveness of the board. It includes several variables related to 
the characteristics of the board that ensure a good functioning of this mechanism (board size, the presence of 
independent directors, the compensation committee ....).  
 
4.3 Managerial ownership / Board of directors / Managerial equity compensation 
 
To investigate the relationship between the effectiveness of the board and the equity-based compensation received by 
the executive in the case of alignment of interest or entrenchment. We refer to the study of Cheng et al. (2012) which is to 
our knowledge the only study that tested the effectiveness of the board in the control of executive compensation for both 
hypotheses (Alignment vs. entrenchment). 
The model to be estimated is as follows: 
For the French case: 
  
Where: 
- Equity.Comp: The natural logarithm of (1 + values of stock options and restricted stock received by the 
manager in year t)2. (Brown and Lee (2010) and Guillet et al. (2012)). 
- Manag.OwnerA, Manag.OwnerB, Manag.OwnerC, Manag.OwnerD, Bd.Index, and Tobin’s Q are previously 
defined. 
- We also include control variables that have been found in prior research to be associated with decision of 
award equity-based compensation (Yermack (1995), Tzioumis (2008) and Van Essen (2012)). 
- Firm size (Size): Natural logarithm of total assets; 
- Firm leverage (Lev): The ratio of total debt to total assets; 
- Ownership concentration (Owner.Concent): The percentage of shares held by the top three shareholders; 
- Institutional investors (Institu): The percentage of shares held by institutional investors.  
                                                                            
2 Calculated using the Black and Scholes’ formula (1973) taking into account of future payments of dividends 
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 Interpretation of Results 5.
 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables used to test the relationship between managerial ownership, board of 
directors' monitoring role and equity compensation received by the manager.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Number Mean Min Max Standard Deviation Difference FR-US 
Tobin’s Q 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
1.542 
2.080 
0.920 
0.643 
11.690 
10.681 
0.920 
1.168 
 
- 0.538*** 
Equity.Comp 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
0.303 
1.511 
0 
0 
3.164 
4.504 
0.464 
0.831 
 
-1.208*** 
Manag.Owner% 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
16.338 
12.177 
0 
0 
97.33 
89.34 
23.365 
20.072 
 
4.161*** 
Bd.Index 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
18.287 
28.917 
4 
9 
32 
34 
5.772 
4.491 
 
-10.630*** 
Size 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
7.268 
7.684 
1.656 
1.656 
11.875 
12.3338 
2.089 
2.132 
 
- 0.415*** 
Lev 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
0.245 
0.229 
0 
0 
1.669 
1.440 
0.182 
0.165 
 
0.016*** 
Volat 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
0.0261 
0.0227 
0.006 
0.007 
0.293 
0.134 
0.020 
0.013 
 
0.0034*** 
 
Owner.Concent % 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
44.92 
18.58 
0 
0 
99.1 
96.87 
23.02 
14.69 
 
26.34*** 
Institu % 
FR 
US 
1431 
1827 
61.25 
38.42 
0 
0 
99.1 
99.8 
27.97 
27.90 
 
22.83*** 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics for the 159 French companies and 203 U.S. companies for the period of 9 years 
from 2002 to 2010. Tobin’s Q ((Market equity value + Book value of equity - Book value of total assets) / Book value of 
total assets), Equity.Comp: The natural logarithm of (1 + values of stock options and restricted stock received by the 
manager in year t), Manag.Owner%: The percentage of shares held by the manager, Bd.Index: The sum of scores for 
each company, Size: Natural logarithm of total assets, Lev: The ratio of total debt to total assets, Volat: The standard 
deviation of stock returns ,Owner.Concent: The percentage of shares held by the top three shareholders, Institu: The 
percentage of shares held by institutional investors. 
For the variable measuring firm's performance (Tobin's Q), it presents respectively for the French and American 
cases 1.54 and 2.08. This proxy is slightly less compared to the results of Cui and Mak (2002), Doukas et al. (2005) and 
Chen et al. (2012) who found a Tobin's Q respectively equal to 2.86, 2.47 and 2.71. 
It is noted that most US companies reward their managers in the form of equity-based compensation from its 
French counterpart. In fact, the mean difference is due to legal reasons. This compensation component has been entered 
into force in the package manager in the French case recently relative to American context. The enactment of NRE 2001 
and the Finance Act 2005, which respectively allow the award of stock options and restricted stock for the French 
manager. 
At the score board, American firms recorded a mean score of 28.92 against 18.29 for French companies. This 
difference in averages is explained in legislature. Indeed, for the United States, the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002 that requires U.S. companies to follow a set of recommendations to ensure a better  functioning of board to 
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monitor the manager. Contrary to the French case the recommendations emitted by the AEFP / MEDEF for good 
governance practice within the firm does not have the regulatory character after 2008 that is to say, after the enactment 
of Law No. 2008-649, which requires the implementation of recommendations of the Code AEFP / MEDEF. 
As for variables measuring ownership concentration and the institutional investors, there is a difference explained 
by divergence in the structure of ownership for both markets. The U.S. market is characterized by a dispersed ownership 
unlike the French market, which is concentrated in the ownership structure (A difference in average for the variable 
measuring the ownership concentration is 26.34%). In addition, these two markets belong to two different systems of 
governance where in the French case, the officer control is done with institutional investors, which explains the high 
percentage of this type of investors in this market compared to the U.S. case (A difference in average is 22.83%). 
At the level of the variables: Size, Lev and Volat, respectively measuring the size of the firm's, leverage and 
volatility of stock returns, we observe that there is not much difference for the two samples. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used for the French and American 
companies. We notice that the coefficients between variables for the two cases are rather weak and we can deduce the 
absence of multicollinearity problem.  
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix of Pearson (French companies) 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Equity.Comp 
Manag.Owner 
Bd.Index 
Size 
Lev 
Volat 
Owner.Concent 
Institu 
1
1 
0.0421** 
0.0779*** 
0.0939*** 
-0.1007*** 
-0.2570*** 
0.0082 
-0.0087 
0.1233*** 
2
 
1 
-0.0414* 
0.0960*** 
0.0499** 
-0.0709*** 
0.0049 
-0.1481 
0.0001 
3
 
 
1 
-0.0853*** 
0.0231 
-0.0473** 
0.0185 
0.0420* 
0.0292 
4
 
 
 
1 
0.0010 
-0.0102 
-0.1230*** 
-0.1440*** 
-0.0227 
5
 
 
 
 
1 
0.0639*** 
-0.0035 
0.0090 
-0.0818*** 
6
 
 
 
 
 
1 
-0.0090 
0.0756*** 
-0.0571** 
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
0.0232 
0.0524** 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
0.0374 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The table presents the correlation coefficients between the variables selected for a sample of 159 French firms for the 
period from 2002 to 2010. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of Pearson (U.S. companies) 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Equity.Comp 
Manag.Owner 
Bd.Index 
Size 
Lev 
Volat 
Owner.Concent 
Institu 
1
1 
0.0369** 
0.0360** 
0.0244** 
-0.3097*** 
-0.1823*** 
0.0333 
0.0050 
-0.0977*** 
2
 
1 
-0.2934*** 
-0.0111*** 
0.4392*** 
-0.0144 
0.0348 
-0.3176*** 
0.0322 
3
 
 
1 
0.1167*** 
-0.3918*** 
-0.0710*** 
-0.0251 
0.4208*** 
-0.1999*** 
4
 
 
 
1 
-0.0697*** 
-0.0341 
-0.1112*** 
0.0011 
0.0592** 
5
 
 
 
 
1 
0.1903*** 
-0.0917*** 
-0.3091*** 
0.1758*** 
6
 
 
 
 
 
1 
0.0585** 
-0.0456* 
0.1707*** 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
-0.0567** 
-0.0255 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
-0.0803 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The table presents the correlation coefficients between the variables selected for a sample of 203 U.S. companies for the 
period from 2002 to 2010. 
It shows that the company performance measured by Tobin's Q is positively associated with managerial ownership 
and effectiveness of the board as measured by the variable (Bd.Index) regardless of the sample selected. In addition, the 
correlation between the variables (Bd.Index) and (Manag.Owner) is negative in the French case, confirming the 
hypothesis of substitution between governance mechanisms, unlike the U.S. case where it has been found a positive 
correlation between these two variables. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the distribution of samples by percentage of shares held by the manager, following the 
French and American market. We note that over 60% of the number of observations (Company / Year) belong to the 
interval where the managerial ownership is between 0% and 10%. In addition, these tables show a non-linear relationship 
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between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership for the French and American cases. Indeed, from Table 4, which 
corresponds to the French case, we see an increase of Tobin's Q to the interval [50%, 60%] where the proxy begins to 
decrease.  
 
Table 4: Distribution of the sample of French companies by percentage of managerial ownership 
 
N Tobin’s Q Equity.Comp Bd.Index 
0%  Manag.Owner < 10% 879 1.5038 0.3706 19.5961 
10%  Manag.Owner < 20% 122 1.50810 0.1751 17.5 
20%  Manag.Owner < 30% 89 1.6026 0.1315 15.1236 
30%  Manag.Owner < 40% 49 1.6377 0.1025 15 
40%  Manag.Owner < 50% 62 1.7779 0.0175 15.5968 
50%  Manag.Owner < 60% 117 2.0422 0.3094 14.2245 
60%  Manag.Owner < 70% 50 1.4900 0.369 17.8889 
70%  Manag.Owner < 80% 60 1.4524 0.438 17.9333 
80%  Manag.Owner < 90% 2 1.3250 0.734 20.5 
90%  Manag.Owner < 100% 1 0.9295 0.742 19 
 
The table presents the distribution of the sample of French companies by percentage of managerial ownership where we 
give for each interval the number of observations (N), the means of Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q), equity based compensation 
(Equity.Comp) and the score board (Bd.Index). 
Table 5, we can detect that there are two extreme points (minimum in the region [30%, 40%] and Maximum in the 
region [60%, 70%] in accordance with the observations of Davies et al. (2005).  
 
Table 5: Distribution of the sample of U.S. companies by percentage of managerial ownership 
 
N Tobin’s Q Equity.Comp Bd.Index 
0%  Manag.Owner < 10% 1178 2.0444 1.6520 29.0696 
10%  Manag.Owner < 20% 249 2.1003 1.6040 28.5224 
20%  Manag.Owner < 30% 134 2.0279 1.5725 28.2125 
30%  Manag.Owner < 40% 80 1.9385 1.5568 26.625 
40%  Manag.Owner < 50% 48 1.9947 1.5374 25.75 
50%  Manag.Owner < 60% 41 2.4156 1.5070 26.3667 
60%  Manag.Owner < 70% 30 3.7544 1.0526 24.4900 
70%  Manag.Owner < 80% 33 2.7347 1.3660 28.5 
80%  Manag.Owner < 90% 30 2.5395 1.4507 29.0606 
90%  Manag.Owner < 100% 4 2.1138 1.4826 28.7561 
 
The table presents the distribution of the sample of U.S. companies by percentage of managerial ownership where we 
give for each interval the number of observations (N), the means of Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q), equity based compensation 
(Equity.Comp) and the score board (Bd.Index). 
For (Equity.Comp) and (Bd.Index) variables, we see that for both cases they decrease to a some level of 
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managerial ownership corresponding to intervals [60%, 70%] for U.S. firms and [40%50%] for French companies. These 
two regions correspond to the maximum value of Tobin's Q then these results are consistent with the theoretical 
motivation where we assume the substitutability mechanism of manager controls.  
 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
5.2.1 Managerial ownership / Performance 
 
Table 6 presents the results of equation (1) to test the relationship between performance and managerial ownership3. 
First, we notice that for the two samples, the result related to model 1 and 6 shows a positive and statistically 
significant relationship at 1% for the U.S. case and 5% for the French case. This confirms the agency theory, which states 
that the managerial ownership is a means to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders, which leads to 
an improved performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Then, for columns 2 and 7, we examine the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance by including the square term of managerial  
ownership (k = 2).  The results for the two cases provide strong support for both the alignment of interest 
hypothesis and the hypothesis of entrenchment. In fact, we found statistically significant coefficients for the variables 
(Manag.Owner) and (Manag.Owner)2.  
In particular, the results show that managerial ownership / performance curve is “inverted U-shaped” according to 
the results found by McConnell and Servaes (1990), Chen and Steiner (2000), and Florackis et al. (2009) and Chen et al. 
(2012). The performance reaches a maximum level for managerial ownership, which corresponds to 21%4 for the U.S 
case and 57%5 for the French case. 
For k = 4 (column 4 and column 9), we find the coefficients that correspond to variables (Manag.Owner), 
(Manag.Owner)², (Manag.Owner)3 and (Manag.Owner)4 statistically significant only in the American context at 1%, 
according to the studies of Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Hu and Zhou (2008).  
The quadratic relationship is not available in the French context, this is due of a high levels of ownership 
concentration. Therefore, the French manager can only be expropriated after the holding of a major proportion of firm 
share that can completely control the company (over 50%). In contrast, in the American case where ownership structure 
is much dispersed, managerial entrenchment may be realize not only with high percentages of shares (over 50%) but 
also at low levels of capital. In the American case, there are three critical points at level of 11%, 48% and 61%6 
(Alignment - Entrenchment - Alignment - Entrenchment). 
For low level of managerial ownership [0%, 11%], the internal and external governance mechanisms are more 
effectively to control manager (Fama (1980), Morck et al. (1988) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)). In addition, 
according to Davies et al. (2005) in the situation (A small percentage of managerial ownership), a grant of stock options 
or restricted stock is necessary to encourage the manager to create value by tying his wealth with those of shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
3 We perform the test for homogeneity or we found the presence of a specific effect. In order to discriminate between the fixed effect and 
random effect we perform the Hausman test, which advocates that we must adopt the fixed effect model. 
4 The estimated model is: Tobin's Q = 3.21 + 0.0069*Manag.Owner - 1.58 * 10-4*Manag.Owner² + 0.13*Size -0.034*Lev - 5.92*Volat. The 
maximum is obtained by the derivative of this equation with respect to the variable (Manag.Owner) and putting it equal to 0. 
5 The estimated model is: Tobin's Q = 3.82 + 0.0111*Manag.Owner – 9.64*10-4*Manag.Owner² + 0.28*Size - 0.28*Lev - 1.38*Volat. The 
maximum is obtained by the derivative of this equation with respect to the variable (Manag.Owner) and putting it equal to 0. 
6  The estimated model is: Tobin's Q = 3.18 + 0.297*Manag.Owner – 1.8*10-3*Manag.Owner² + 3.63*10-5*Manag.Owner3-2.25*10-
7*Manag.Owner4+0.13*Size- 0.14*Lev - 5.95*Volat. The maximum is obtained by the derivative of this equation with respect to the 
variable (Manag.Owner) and putting it equal to 0. 
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Table 6: The result of the regression of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance 
 
 France (Tobin’s Q) U.S. (Tobin’s Q) k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 
Constant 3.8050***(12.86) 
3.8237***
(12.94) 
3.7517***
(12.51) 
3.7518***
(12.43) 
3.7497***
(12.44) 
3.2381***
(10.85) 
3.2095***
(10.81) 
3.2126***
(10.80) 
3.1847*** 
(10.74) 
3.1901*** 
(10.75) 
Size 0.2820***(7.17) 
0.2825***
(7.19) 
0.2795***
(7.11) 
-0.2796***
(7.10) 
0.2768***
(7.04) 
0.1372***
(3.59) 
0.1299***
(3.42) 
0.1300***
(3.42) 
0.1262*** 
(3.33) 
0.1263*** 
(3.33) 
Lev -0.3002*(-1.86) 
-0.2890*
(-1.79) 
-0.2923*
(-1.81) 
-0.2923*
(-1.81) 
-0.3116*
(-1.93) 
-0.0503
(-0.30) 
-0.0337
(-0.20) 
-0.0357
(-0.21) 
0.0141 
(0.08) 
0.0081 
(0.05) 
Volat -1.4108(-1.56) 
-1.3813
(1.53) 
-1.4125
(-1.56) 
-1.4124
(1.56) 
-1.3878
(-1.54) 
-6.0585***
(-4.31) 
-5.9202***
(-4.23) 
-5.9195***
(-4.23) 
-5.9580*** 
(-4.27) 
-6.0000*** 
(-4.32) 
Manag.Owner 0.0063**(2.18) 
0.0111***
(2.99) 
0.0048
(-0.81) 
0.0048
(0.54) 
0.0191*
(1.68) 
0.0031***
(3.04) 
0.0069***
(2.69) 
0.0078
(1.59) 
0.0297*** 
(3.64) 
0.0381*** 
(2.91) 
Manag.Owner ²  -9.64e-5**(-2.05) 
-7.77e-5**
(-2.25) 
-7.77e-5**
(-2.25) 
-6.77e-5*
(-1.94)  
-1.58e-4***
(-4.24) 
-1.94e-4
(-1.10) 
-1.8e-3*** 
(-3.58) 
-2.9e-3** 
(-2.19) 
Manag.Owner3   1.25e-06(1.41) 
1.24e-06
(0.27) 
2.87e-5*
(1.84)   
3.30e-7
(-0.21) 
3.63e-5*** 
(3.35) 
7.15e-4 
(1.61) 
Manag.Owner4    -5.25e-11(0.00) 
-6.41e-07**
(-1.98)    
-2.25e-7*** 
(-3.35) 
-7.17e-7 
(-1.18) 
Manag.Owner5     3.64e-09(0.09)     
2.35e-9 
(0.82) 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 
Ficher 15.50 13.27 11.40 9.76 9.06 10.52 12.10 10.08 10.30 9.10 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The table presents the results of the regression of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance 
(After the tests required, we chose the fixed effect model. We only present estimates of fixed effect model). 
Manag.Owner: The percentage of shares held by the manager, Manag.Owner2: The square of the percentage of shares 
held by the manager, Manag.Owner3: The cube of the percentage of shares held by the manager, Manag.Owner4: The 
fourth power of the percentage of shares held by the manager, Manag.Owner5: the five power of the percentage of 
shares held by the manager, all other variables are defined in Table 1. 
According to Denis et al. (1997) and Dahya et al. (2002), the intermediate level of managerial ownership [11%, 
48%], a greater percentage of managerial ownership leads to greater power of the executive in the form of voting rights. 
The manager can take advantage of this situation by increasing personal wealth even at the expense of the firm's value. 
For a level of managerial ownership between 48% and 61%, the principal and agent's objectives become 
convergent. According to Franks et al. (2001) and Davies et al. (2005) in this case, the manager escapes the capital 
market discipline, but it is still subject to the discipline of block holders and institutional investors who have some control 
over the management officer’s even at high levels managerial ownership. 
Beyond 61%, the management of the company is in the hands of the officer who is the sole owner then in this 
case, it is out-of-control (internal and external governance mechanisms). Indeed, with such participation, on the one 
hand, the likelihood of hostile takeover becomes zero (failure of external control) and secondly, the absence of holders in 
block (internal control failure) then the leader can take advantage of this situation to expropriate and maximize his 
personal wealth, but at the expense of the interests of minority shareholders Morck et al. (1988).  
Another argument that explains the negative relationship between performance and a high level of managerial 
ownership is developed by Smith and Stulz (1985) and Chen and Lee (2010). They suggest that the degree of risk 
aversion is increasingly high relative to the share held by the executive, which can lead the potential agency problem of 
under-investment that has a negative impact on firm performance. 
Finally, for k = 3, we test whether the relationship between managerial ownership and performance is cubic 
(columns 3 and 8), but we did not find a significant relationship. This result was found in the case k= 5. From these 
findings, we can reject the cubic and quantum relationship between these variables for the two samples. 
In the following, we have verified that there is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance but in a different form for the two markets. This difference is mainly explained by a large difference in 
concentration of ownership across two countries.  
In the following, we will take a quadratic model for the U.S. case and a square model for the French case. 
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5.2.2 Managerial ownership / Performance / Board of directors 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the piecewise linear model that examines the relationship between managerial ownership, 
board control and firm performance7.  
 
Table 7: The result of piecewise regression of the relationship between managerial ownership, board monitoring and firm 
performance 
 
 France (Tobin’s Q) U.S. (Tobin’s Q)
Constant 3.2289***(7.35) 
1.7002***
(3.22) 
Manag.Owner A 0.0132**(2.04) 
0.0904***
(3.45) 
Manag.Owner B 
 
-0.0703*
(-1.91) 
-0.0392***
(-3.19) 
Manag.Owner C  0.0670**(2.05) 
Manag.Owner D  -0.0459*(-1.69) 
Bd.Index 1.2632(1.46) 
1.9893***
(2.92) 
Manag.Owner A * Bd.Index
 
-0.0376***
(-3.21) 
-0.1206***
(-3.40) 
Manag.Owner B * Bd.Index 0.1086*(1.66) 
0.0395**
(2.34) 
Manag.Owner C * Bd.Index  -0.0234***(-3.37) 
Manag.Owner D * Bd.Index  0.0700*(1.84) 
Size -0.2284***(-4.05) 
0.031
(0.53) 
Lev -0.2681(-0.72) 
-0.1767
(-0.38) 
Volat -0.9816(-1.18) 
-11.0518
(-1.49) 
Size * Bd.Index -0.1227(-1.18) 
0.2430
(0.56) 
Lev * Bd.Index -0.1446(-0.20) 
0.0987
(0.14) 
Volat* Bd.Index -1.1939(-0.21) 
9.4935
(0.94) 
R² 0.16 0.12
Ficher 6.77 15.00
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Observations 1431 1827
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The table presents the result of the piecewise regression of the relationship between managerial ownership, board 
monitoring and firm performance (After the effectuation the tests required, we chose the fixed effect model. We only 
present estimates of fixed effect model). Manag.Owner A, Manag.OwnerB, Manag.Owner C and Manag.Owner D are 
defined in section 4.2, all other variables are defined in Table 1. 
The main conclusion derived from this table, on the one hand, the interaction of variables indicating the presence 
of managerial entrenchment (Manag.OwnerB and Manag.OwnerD) and board effectiveness with the performance of the 
firm are positively significant for both samples. On the other hand, in the case of interest's alignment (Manag.OwnerA and 
Manag.OwnerC), the variables combined with the board effectiveness are negative and statistically significant at 1% for 
the American and French cases with firm’s performance. The search results can be interpreted from the hypothesis of 
                                                                            
7 We apply the homogeneity test and Hausman test, and we chose the fixed effect model 
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substitutability of governance mechanisms previously developed by Denis and Sarin (1999) and Weir et al (2001). 
Lasfer (2006) and Cheng et al. (2012) suggest that managerial ownership and board are two internal governance 
mechanisms to mitigate the agency problem between the principal and agent. Thus, if the managerial ownership leads to 
a convergence of interests and an increase in firm performance so there is a minimal follow-up by the board of directors 
(negative relationship between Manag.OwnerA (Manag.OwnerC) * Bd.Index and Tobin's Q). 
Therefore, according to Cheng et al (2012) and referring to the hypothesis of substitutability between governance 
mechanisms, when the entrenchment effect is dominating, the authors assume that the board is effective in monitoring 
managerial entrenchment to mitigate agency conflicts that can appear (positive relationship between Manag.OwnerB 
(Manag.OwnerD) * Bd.Index and Tobin's Q). 
In summary, regardless of the sample, in the case of the managerial entrenchment (a decrease of corporate 
performance) the board is a substitute for managerial ownership to mitigate the agency conflicts. However, in the 
alignment of interest there is less demand on the board to be effective to monitoring the manager. 
 
5.2.3 Managerial ownership / Board of directors / Managerial equity compensation 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the relationship between equity-based compensation received by the executive, 
managerial ownership and effectiveness of the board of directors. For the two samples, we note that firms distribute more 
than stock-based compensation in the case of managerial entrenchment (positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the variables (Equity.Comp) and (Manag.OwnerB) (Manag.OwnerD). In contrast, in the case of interest 
alignment, companies have less award of stock options and restricted stock (negative and statistically significant 
relationship between equity-based compensation (Equity.Comp) and variables (Manag.OwnerA) (Manag.OwnerC). 
 
Table 8: The result of piecewise regression of the relationship between managerial ownership, board monitoring and 
equity based compensation 
 
 France (Equity.Comp) U.S. (Equity.Comp)
Constant 0.1856(0.58) 
0.0582
(0.12) 
Manag.Owner A -0.0075***(-3.06) 
- 0.0352**
(2.35) 
Manag.Owner B 
 
0.0455***
(3.79) 
0.0160*
(1.67) 
Manag.Owner C  
- 0.0450*
(1.81) 
Manag.Owner D  
0.060**
(2.23) 
Bd.Index -0.3497(-0.53) 
-0.3030
(-0.52) 
Manag.Owner A * Bd.Index
 
0.1433
(0.37) 
0.0591
(0.32) 
Manag.Owner B * Bd.Index -0.0675***(-2.99) 
-0.0971**
(-2.22) 
Manag.Owner C * Bd.Index  
-0.0822
(-0.11) 
Manag.Owner D * Bd.Index  
-0.0771**
(-2.06) 
Size 0.0595*(1.76) 
0.2280***
(5.85) 
Lev -0.0756(-0.36) 
-0.693
(-1.42) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0650(-1.63) 
0.3470***
(3.16) 
Owner.Concent
 
-0.0259
(-0.11) 
0.0913
(0.10) 
Institu -0.3062(-1.50) 
0.0115
(0.87) 
Size * Bd.Index -0.0201(-0.32) 
0.0514**
(2.50) 
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 France (Equity.Comp) U.S. (Equity.Comp)
Lev * Bd.Index -0.4097(-1.00) 
0.0591*
(1.76) 
Tobin’s Q * Bd.Index 0.2909***(2.90) 
-0.3583**
(-2.48) 
Owner.Concent * Bd.Index -0.1071(-0.23) 
-0.4950
(-0.41) 
Institu* Bd.Index
 
0.0101*
(1.84) 
1.3150**
(2.25) 
R² 0.07 0.04
Ficher 5.89 3.87
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Observations 1431 1827
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The table presents the result of the piecewise regression of the relationship between managerial ownership, board 
monitoring and equity based compensation (After the effectuation the tests required, we chose the fixed effect model. We 
only present estimates of fixed effect model). Manag.Owner A, Manag.OwnerB, Manag.Owner C and Manag.Owner D are 
defined in section 4.2, all other variables are defined in Table 1. 
Contrary to the prediction of agency theory and the majority of previous studies such as Mehran (1995), Ofek and 
Yermack (2000), Nagar and Rajan (2005) and Low (2009) who assume that the manager holds more share, these 
interests become aligned with shareholders and consequently, there is less need to grant equity-based compensation. 
Our results reject the hypothesis that the agency theory predicts a decreasing linear relationship between the percentage 
of shares held by the manager and the total of equity compensation granted to the officer. We argue here that equity-
based compensation awards depends on the alignment of interests and the managerial entrenchment (non-linear 
relationship). 
In fact, according to Daily et al. (2003) and Raedy and Wilson (2012), equity-based compensation is a way to align 
managers and shareholders’ interests. On the one hand, the alignment interest effect exists, the award of such 
compensation is unlikely. On the other hand, in the case of managerial entrenchment, it is an existence of agency 
problems (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009) which will be mitigated by the attribute of the stock option and restricted stock. 
For combined variables measuring the impact of board effectiveness and managerial ownership (case of alignment 
of interests and managerial entrenchment) and equity-based compensation. On the one hand, a negative and statistically 
significant relationship is seen between the variables Manag.OwnerB*Bd.Index and Manag.OwnerD*Bd.Index (managerial 
entrenchment) and the endogenous variable Equity.Comp. On the other hand, in the case of the alignment of interest 
(Manag.OwnerA*Bd.Index and Manag.OwnerC*Bd.Index), a non-significant (neutral) relationship was detected between 
these variables and equity-based compensation. 
One can interpret these results found based on the findings of John and Senbet (1998) and  Aguilera et al. (2008), 
who assume that if the managerial entrenchment dominates, the behavior of the manager to expropriate (take advantage 
of stock based compensation) will be mitigated by effective board monitoring (substitute hypothesis among different 
governance mechanisms).  
However, when the alignment of interests of managerial ownership is so dominant, a weak allocation of stock-
based compensation as a way to align the interests between the principal and the agent for the benefit of the manager. 
Then the board will not impact to control the level of CEO compensation in this case. 
In general, in the case of managerial entrenchment, the board is effective to substitute the dysfunction caused by 
the managerial ownership, which reduces the probability of award of equity-based compensation as a means of aligning 
interests of principal and agent. 
 
 Endogeneity Problem 6.
 
The central issue in the majority of empirical studies is to determine the causal links between managerial ownership and 
firm performance (Cho (1998), Davies et al. (2005) and Ruan et al. (2011)).  
Anderson et al. (2000) assume that the agency theory postulates that there exists a simultaneous relationship 
between performance and the level of CEO pay in particular, the awarding of equity-based compensation. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) argue that managerial ownership is endogenous to the specific characteristics of firms. 
So, we follow the same methodology as Ng (2005) and Cheng et al. (2012) by applying the system of simultaneous 
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equations8 to capture multiple potential relationships between managerial ownership, board of directors’ efficiency and 
equity-based compensation. 
Hence the model to be estimated is as follows: 
For the French case: 
 
 
 
For the American case: 
(10) 
   (11) 
  (12) 
To estimate this model, we chose to apply the 3SLS method because it takes into account the dependency 
between the error terms so unlike the 2SLS method to estimate each equation separately, this method allows 
simultaneous estimation of predefined equations. 
Table 9 presents the results of the simultaneous equation, we observe that regardless of the sample used, there is 
a statistically significant relationship at the 1% threshold for different levels of managerial ownership (Manag.OwnerA, 
Manag.OwnerB, Manag.OwnerC and Manag.OwnerD) with variable Tobin's Q (column 1 and 4).  
This result is consistent with the postulates of the agency theory and the entrenchment theory that assume the 
managerial ownership is a governance mechanism that allows to affect firm’s performance (In this case, the performance 
is determined by the managerial ownership (exogenous variable)).  
In the case where managerial ownership is an endogenous variable, we note that the results are inconclusive. We 
found a non-significant relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q for the French case (column 2) and a 
positive and statistically significant relationship at the 1% (column 5) in the American case.  
The endogeneity hypothesis is validated only in the American case, this is consistent with the investigation of Cho 
(1998) and Davies et al. (2005), but this is not similar to the results found by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Cheng et 
al. (2012).  
Davies et al. (2005) explain the relationship of endogenous assuming that the manager has a tendency to hold 
shares in companies characterized by a high value in order to maximize his wealth, but hidden behind this behavior is to 
control such companies. In contrast to the French case where institutional investors and blockholders have an important 
role in monitoring the officer. Manager control in the American context is mainly through the capital market when a 
company characterized by a relatively high performance is a target for the manager to expropriate. Consequently, the 
manager tries to neutralize the main governance mechanism (capital market monitoring) by acquiring a large percentage 
of shares. 
At the (Bd.Index) that measures the effectiveness of the board, a negative and statistically significant relationship 
was observed between this variable and managerial ownership for two cases which confirms that these two mechanisms 
are substitutable to ensure an alignment of interests  between the manager and shareholders (Prevost et al. 2002). 
For columns 3 and 6, according to the result previously found that the awarding of equity compensation is a non-
monotonic function with managerial ownership. Earlier studies found a negative relationship between the equity-based 
compensation and managerial ownership in relying only on agency theory, which postulates that the alignment of interest 
is by the acquisition of large number of shares of the officer.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
8 We verified the conditions of order and rank. For order condition: The number of endogenous variables and excluded exogenous 
variables must be greater than or equal to the number of equations minus one. To rank condition: According to Greene (1997), which 
assumes that a system which meets the order conditions is extremely rare not fulfill the rank conditions. Therefore, our system is 
identifiable. 
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Table 9: The analysis by the simultaneous equations between managerial ownership, firm performance and equity based 
compensation 
 
 France U.S.
Variables Tobin’s Q (model 7) 
Manag.Owner 
(model 8) 
Equity.Comp 
(model 9) 
Tobin’s Q 
(model10) 
Manag.Owner 
(model 11) 
Equity.Comp 
(model 12) 
 
Constant 2.9491*** (25.10) 
51.5393*** 
(16.78) 
-0.0008 
(-0.22) 
3.1801*** 
(15.50) 
13.4382*** 
(3.68) 
 
-0.0027 
(-0.60) 
Manag.OwnerA 0.0060***(4.32)  
-0.0037***
(-5.62) 
0.0188***
(3.09)  
-0.1178*** 
(-7.08) 
Manag.Owner B -0.0216***(-2.89)  
0.0026***
(3.88) 
-0.8197***
(-3.63)  
0.0062*** 
(2.79) 
Manag.Owner C    0.0503***(6.99)  
-0.0447*** 
(-2.65) 
Manag.Owner D    -0.0074**(-2.52)  
0.0759*** 
(5.76) 
Bd.Index -0.0994(-0.57) 
-3.6431***
(-5.50) 
0.2627***
(3.22) 
0.0069
(1.07) 
-8.4771**
(-2.09) 
0.0057 
(1.04) 
Size -0.1500***(-11.45) 
-3.2558***
(-9.39) 
0.0794***
(12.53) 
-0.0346***
(-2.83) 
0.3853*
(1.75) 
0.0261*** 
(2.87) 
Lev 0.6900***(5.15) 
-6.4468*
(-1.92) 
-0.1901***
(-3.04) 
1.7834***
(11.38)  
-0.2973** 
(-2.46) 
Volat 0.2985(0.26)   
0.1328
(0.06)  
 
 
Tobin’s Q  -2.3094(-0.53) 
0.0751***
(6.17)  
2.4293***
(6.02) 
0.0262 
(1.51) 
Equity.Comp  -12.5527***(-9.10)   
-2.0747***
(-3.68)  
Owner.Concent   -0.3301***(-6.40)   
-0.0040 
(-0.84) 
Institu   -0.0916**(-2.33)   
0.0181 
(0.26) 
R² 
Observations 
0.11
1431 
0.14
1431 
0.26
1431 
0.11
1827 
0.007
1827 
0.04 
1827 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
The table presents the analysis of the simultaneous equations of managerial ownership, firm performance and equity 
based compensation by using the 3SLS method. 
Therefore, managerial ownership is a decreasing function of the decision to award stock options or restricted stock. 
However, the non-monotony found in our study may be explained by the effect of managerial entrenchment, in which 
case the leader can benefit from equity-based compensation in order to reduce agency problems that may be born with 
the principal in this situation. 
In addition, regardless of the sample selected, companies’ large size and less leveraged pay their managers more 
in shares, in accordance with the results found by (Ryan and Wiggins III (2001) and Ushida (2006)).  
We note that there is a negative relationship between the variables measuring the concentration of ownership and 
the presence of institutional investors, with the allocation of equity-based compensation in the French case. On the 
contrary, in the American case, these two variables are not significant. This result demonstrates the importance of these 
variables in the French case as a manager control mechanism relative to the U.S. case. 
 
 Conclusion 7.
 
This study focuses on 159 French companies and 203 U.S. companies for the period from 2002 to 2010 where we found 
a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and performance to the French case and a 
quadratic relationship for the U.S. case. This difference in the shape of the curve is due to the difference in the 
concentration of ownership. 
Using these turning points that explain the effect of alignment or managerial entrenchment, we estimated a model 
of piecewise linear regression where we found that independent of the sample used in the case of managerial 
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entrenchment, the board is a substitute for managerial ownership to solve the agency problem. 
In addition, on the one hand, the equity-based compensation is non-linear function with managerial ownership in 
contrast to previous studies that assume a monotonous or non-significant relationship. On the other hand, referring to the 
substitution hypothesis, this study demonstrates the effectiveness of the board as a substitute for managerial ownership 
in the case of managerial entrenchment. 
Given the importance of the problem of endogeneity of managerial ownership, we conducted a simultaneous 
equation where we found that the endogeneity hypothesis is verified only in the U.S case. This result leads us to believe 
that the American manager has a preference to hold a large percentage of shares of firms that performed well to 
neutralize the capital market monitoring, which is the principal governance mechanism for this type of firm. In contrast, 
the French manager monitoring by the capital market is not large enough (a major investor control institutional holders 
and blocks) which reduces the probability of this opportunistic behavior in this case. 
Our study has some limitations that are worth mentioning. We have limited that the board has an effect on the 
control mechanism of the manager then it is interesting to see the impact of other internal and even outside governance 
mechanisms as an alternative to solve the problem of managerial entrenchment. As we mentioned before, the non-linear 
relationship between equity-based compensation and managerial ownership may conduct a study on the factors of stock-
based compensation, taking into account alignment and divergence of interests. 
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